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Abstract
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with public capital and imperfect
competition. In the model, we take into account monopolistic competition of intermidiate
sector and endogenous determination of the number of firms in the sector by considering the
fixed cost to keep production going. We show that the number of firms in intermidiate sector
is affected by fiscal policy. Furthermore, it is demonstrated in the paper that market structure
plays a key role in reducing the growth-maximizing tax rate.
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The literature on endogenous growth and ﬁscal policy, as developed by Barro
(1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), examines the macroeconomic effects of vari-
ous policies in endogenous growth models with perfect competition and constant
returns to scale with respect to private capital and public capital. They show that
the growth-maximizing tax rate on output is equal to the output elasticity of public
capital.
This paper describes an endogenous growth model with public capital and
monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sector. Our model departs
from the precedent standard models by incorporating monopolistic competition
in the intermediate goods sector and endogenizing each incumbent ﬁrm’s price-
cost markup.1 The main results of this paper are summarized as follows. We ﬁnd
that a tax rate increase on revenue in the intermediate goods sector decreases the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the intermediate sector. Furthermore, because a
higher tax rate raises industrial concentration and raises equilibrium markups, the
positive effect on economic growth is notably smaller than those in conventional
models of perfect competition without markups.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the basic model.
Section 3 establishes the unique saddle-path equilibrium of the dynamic econ-
omy and examines the macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal policy. Finally, Section 4
presents some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We extend the exogenous growth model of Wu and Zhang (2000) to an endoge-
nous growth model by considering the production technology of Barro (1990) and
Futagami et al. (1993).
Producers. The economy has numerous monopolistically competitive inter-
mediate goods producers, indexed by i. Final goods produced in a competitive
sector are given as
Y =

n
−1/
Z n
0
y
(−1)/
i di
/(−1)
, (1)
1In exogenous growth models with monopolistic competition, some studies examine the
macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal policy (e.g., Wu and Zhang (2000), Molana and Zhang (2001),
and Coto-Martinez (2006)).
1where Y is the output of ﬁnal goods, yi the quantity of the ith intermediate good
used, and  > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
Deﬁning Π as the proﬁt of a ﬁnal good producer,
Π = PY −
Z n
0
piyidi. (2)
In Eq. (2), P and pi respectively denote the prices of the ﬁnal good and the ith
intermediate good. Solving the proﬁt maximization problem, the demand function
for a typical intermediate good is derived as
yi =

P
pi
 Y
n
. (3)
The production technology of intermediate goods is given as
yi = F(ki,g) = k
1−α
i g
α, (4)
where ki is the private capital input, g the public capital input, and 0 < α < 1.
The production function of intermediate goods is assumed to exhibit the constant
returns to scale and diminishing returns to each input. The proﬁt function for the
ith intermediate good producer, π, is given as
π = (1 − τ)piyi − rki − piψ (5)
where τ is the tax rate on revenue, r the factor price of private capital and ψ > 0.2
In each moment, an amount ψ of the intermediate good is used up immediately
for administration purposes to maintain production, which is independent of how
much output is produced. Consequently, ψ denotes the ﬁxed cost. Then, the ﬁrst-
order condition for proﬁt maximization yields
r = (1 − τ)p
η − 1
η
[f(x) − f
0(x)x] = (1 − τ)(1 − α)p
η − 1
η
f(x), (6)
wherex ≡ g/k, f(x) ≡ F(1,g/k), andη ≡ −(∂y/∂p)(p/y). Usingthedeﬁnition
of η and (3), we obtain
η(n) =  −
 − 1
n
, (7)
2For convenience, the ﬁrm index i is omitted hereafter.
2where η0(n) = ( − 1)/n2 > 0. Let
µ(n) =
η(n)
η(n) − 1
, (8)
where µ0(n) = −(η(n) − 1)η(n)/η0(n) < 0. Then, Eq. (8) corresponds to the
ﬁrm’s price markup over its marginal cost. It is assumed that
ψ = φ¯ y, (9)
where 0 < φ < 1 and ¯ y is the average output of intermediate goods. To produce
intermediate goods, the purchase of φ¯ y units of intermediate goods is necessary.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms employ the same input amounts, produce
the same quantities and set the same prices: k = K/n, y = Y/n, and p =
P = 1 (by normalization). Finally, free entry into the intermediate sector forces
proﬁts to be zero: π = 0. Note that the symmetric equilibrium is not socially
efﬁcient because imperfection pertains in the intermediate sector. Using the free
entry condition π = 0 and (9), the number of ﬁrms in the intermediate sector is
determined as
1 − τ − φ
(1 − τ)(1 − α)
=
1
µ(n)
. (10)
Then, Eq. (10) leads to n∗ = n(τ). Combining Eq. (6) with Eq. (10), the factor
price of private capital is given as
r = (1 − τ − φ)f(x). (11)
Consumers. The lifetime utility of a representative consumer is deﬁned as
U =
Z ∞
0
C1−σ − 1
1 − σ
exp(−ρt)dt, (12)
where C represents consumption, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution, and ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Because the proﬁt is
zero, the total income of consumers is derived solely from private capital income.
Then, the budget constraint of consumers is given as
˙ K = rK − C. (13)
Each consumer maximizes his objective function, Eq. (12), subject to his budget
constraint, Eq. (13). Solving the optimization problem, we obtain
˙ C
C
=
r − ρ
σ
. (14)
3Government. The government is assumed to invest in public capital and ﬁ-
nanceitsinvestmentwithataxonrevenueintheintermediategoodssector. There-
fore, the government’s budget constraint is given as
˙ g = τny. (15)
3 Dynamic general equilibrium
3.1 Existence and stability of the stationary equilibrium
Deﬁning z as C/K and using x ≡ g/k, z ≡ C/K, Eq. (11), and Eq. (13) – Eq.
(15), the dynamic system of the economy is given as
˙ x
x
= τn
f(x)
x
− (1 − τ − φ)f(x) + z, (16)
˙ z
z
= (1 − τ − φ)

1 − σ
σ

f(x) −
ρ
σ
+ z. (17)
Existence and stability of a stationary equilibrium such as a solution of a dynamic
system, is established as follows.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium that is saddle-point
stable.
(Proof) See Appendix.
Under Proposition 1, the economic growth rate and the number of ﬁrms in
the intermediate goods sector are determined.3 From Eq. (6) and Eq. (14), the
economic growth rate in the long run is given as
γ
∗ =
(1 − τ − φ)f(x∗) − ρ
σ
. (18)
3.2 Macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal policy
We now investigate the effects of ﬁscal policy on the price markup rate, the long-
run number of ﬁrms in the intermediate sector, and the economic growth rate.
3Superscript ∗ denotes the stationary value of the endogenous variable.
4Differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to τ, the effects of a change in the tax rate,
τ, on the price markup are derived as
∂µ∗
∂τ
=
φµ(n∗)
(1 − τ)(1 − τ − φ)
> 0, (19)
where µ∗ = µ(n∗). Therefore, Eq. (19) leads to
∂n∗
∂τ
=
φµ(n∗)
(1 − τ)(1 − τ − φ)µ0(n∗)
< 0. (20)
The effects of a change in φ on the price markup are obtained from Eq. (10):
∂µ∗
∂φ
=
µ(n∗)
1 − τ − φ
> 0. (21)
Using µ∗ = µ(n∗), Eq. (19) yields
∂n∗
∂φ
=
µ(n∗)
(1 − τ − φ)µ0(n∗)
< 0. (22)
The above results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 The price markup, µ∗, is increasing in any of τ and φ. Then, the
number of ﬁrms in the intermediate sector, n∗, is decreasing in any of τ and φ.
An increase in the tax rate, τ, raises the price markup. Then, the smaller
price markup engenders the higher the degree of market power. It engenders less
intense competition in the intermediate sector. Consequently, the number of ﬁrms
in the intermediate sector is decreased by a rise in the tax rate, τ. This mechanism
simulates the effects of a change in the ﬁxed fraction of running costs, φ.
From ˙ x = ˙ z = 0, Eq. (16), and Eq. (17), we obtain
∂x∗
∂τ
=
(1 − θ)n∗ + x∗/σ
(1 − α)τn∗/x∗ + (1 − τ − φ)α/σ
> 0, (23)
∂x∗
∂φ
=
x∗/σ − n∗τλ/φ
(1 − α)τn∗/x∗ + (1 − τ − φ)α/σ
R 0, (24)
where θ ≡ −(τ/n∗)(∂n∗/∂τ) and λ ≡ −(φ/n∗)(∂n∗/∂φ).4
4We assume that θ is less than unity.
5We now examine the effect of a change in the tax rate, τ, on the economic
growth rate, γ∗. Differentiating Eq. (18) with respect to τ yields
∂γ∗
∂τ
= −f(x
∗)

1 − (1 − τ − φ)
α
x∗
∂x∗
∂τ

R 0. (25)
Using Eq. (23) and Eq. (26), we obtain
sign
∂γ∗
∂τ
= sign

(1 − φ)(1 − θ)α
1 − αθ
− τ

. (26)
Differentiating Eq. (18) with respect to φ, the impact of a change in φ on the
economic growth rate is given as
∂γ∗
∂φ
= −
n∗τf(x∗)
σφx∗
(1 − α)φ + (1 − τ − φ)αλ
(1 − α)τn∗/x∗ + (1 − τ − φ)α/σ
< 0. (27)
Therefore, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The growth-maximizing tax rate is given as τ∗, such as
τ
∗ =
(1 − φ)(1 − θ∗)α
1 − αθ∗ .
Furthermore, anincreaseintheﬁxedrateofrunningcost, φ, reducestheeconomic
growth rate, γ∗: i.e., ∂γ∗/∂φ < 0.
The economic intuition for the growth effect of a change in the tax rate, τ, is
as follows. Public investment enhances economic growth through public capital
accumulation (positive growth effect). On the other hand, a raised tax rate, τ,
simultaneously reduces the household’s income, which might otherwise be used
for private investment. Moreover, a rise in τ raises a price markup, µ∗, which
reduces the household’s income. This effect is peculiar to our model with monop-
olistic competition in the intermediate goods sector. These two negative effects
on income have a negative growth effect through a decrease in private investment.
Therefore, imperfect competition in the intermediate goods sector weakens the
positive growth effect of public investment, and the growth-maximizing tax rate
is different from that established by the models with perfect competition in the
intermediate goods sector.5 The explanation for the growth effect of a change in φ
5We consider the relationship between the growth-maximizing tax rate, τ∗, and the ﬁxed frac-
tion of running cost, φ. When α + φ ≤ 1, τ∗ < α holds. In contrast, τ∗ > α might hold if
α + φ > 1. Without imperfection of intermediate goods, the growth-maximizing tax rate is equal
to the output elasticity of public capital, α (e.g., Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993))
6is given as follows. A rise in φ raises a price markup, µ∗ (Proposition 2). On the
other hand, the effect of a rise in φ on public capital accumulation is ambiguous.
These effects combine to reduce the economic growth rate, γ∗.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper described an endogenous growth model with public capital and mo-
nopolistic competition of the intermediate goods sector. The main novelty of the
model compared with pertinent literature on endogenous growth and ﬁscal policy
is that it incorporates monopolistic competition of the intermediate goods sector.
Without monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sector, numerous
ﬁrms exist, obviating markups. Then, ﬁscal policy has no inﬂuence on market
structure, and the growth-maximizing policy is not affected by its market struc-
ture.
However, the opposite implications are established in our model with monop-
olistic competition in the intermediate goods sector. Imperfection in the interme-
diate goods sector brings about markups and restrictions on the number of ﬁrms
that enter the intermediate sector. Fiscal policy affects the market structure and
its market structure strongly inﬂuences macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal policy.
Finally, imperfect competition in the intermediate goods sector weakens the pos-
itive growth effects of public investment more than it would weaken growth in a
perfectly competitive intermediate goods sector; the growth-maximizing tax rate
is different from that established by models with perfect competition in the inter-
mediate goods sector.
Therefore, monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sector brings
about a drastic difference in the macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal policy in compar-
ison with that in a perfectly competitive intermediate goods sector. Based on our
analyses, it is essential for evaluating the macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal policy
to consider imperfection of the intermediate goods sector.
7Appendix
In a stationary equilibrium, ˙ x = ˙ z = 0 holds. Equations (16) and (17) yield
τn
f(x)
x
− (1 − τ − φ)f(x) + z = 0, (28)
(1 − τ − φ)

1 − σ
σ

f(x) −
ρ
σ
+ z = 0. (29)
Using Eq. (28) and Eq. (29), we obtain
τn
f(x)
x
−
(1 − τ − φ)f(x) − ρ
σ
= 0. (30)
Let
P(x) ≡ τn
f(x)
x
−
(1 − τ − φ)f(x) − ρ
σ
.
P(x) has the following properties: P(0) = +∞, P(∞) = −∞, and P 0(x) < 0.
These properties shows that Eq. (30) has a unique solution, x∗. Because x∗ is
uniquely determined, Eq. (28) or Eq. (29) leads to z∗.
Linearizing Eq. (16) and Eq. (17) around the unique stationary equilibrium,
the dynamics are approximated using the following linear system:

˙ x
˙ z

=

J11 J12
J21 J22

x − x∗
z − z∗

, (31)
where
J11 = −
τn∗(1 − α)f(x∗)
x∗ − (1 − τ − φ)f
0(x
∗)x
∗,
J12 = x
∗,
J21 = (1 − τ − φ)

1 − σ
σ

f
0(x
∗)z
∗,
J22 = z
∗.
Then, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of Eq. (31) is given as
detJ = J11J22 − J12J21
= −
τn∗(1 − α)f(x∗)
x∗ − (1 − τ − φ)f
0(x
∗)x
∗z
∗ < 0.
This result shows that the stationary equilibrium is a saddle-point.
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